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DELEGATION IN A DUOPOLISTIC DIFFERENTIATED GOOD 
MARKET WITH BERTRAND COMPETITION
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The impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern 
authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) consid­
ered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and 
Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar prob­
lem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition 
and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the 
firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive 
to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms 
reach collusion non-cooperatively.
KEYWORDS: Delegation - Regulation - Non-cooperative games - Bertrand 
competition - Cournot competition - Duopoly - Product diiferentiation - 
Principal-Agent games - Efficiency
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ÖZET
BİR DÜOPOL BİÇİMDE FARKLILAŞTIRILMIŞ ÜRÜN PİYASASINDA 
’’BERTRAND” REKABETÇİ DELEGASYON
Hüseyin Yıldırım
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, iktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof.Dr.Semih Koray
31 sayfa
Temmuz 1995
Delegasyonun firmalar üzerindeki etkisi birçok modern iktisatçı tarafin- 
dan incelenmiştir. Vickers(1985), Fershtman,Judd(1987) ve Sklivas(1987) 
problemi pozitif iktisat teorisi açısından ele alırken, Koray ve Sertel(1989) 
problemi regülasyon olarak düşünmüşlerdir. Bu çalışmada farklılaştırılmış 
ürünlere sahip bir düopol piyasasinda Bertrand rekabeti altında benzer bir 
problem ele alınmaktadır. Delegasyon zinciri 5 işletmeciye kadar uzatıldığında 
firmaların elde edecekleri kârlarda görülen artış, iki firmanın da yeniden dele­
gasyon yapmak için nedenleri olduğunu göstermektedir. Buradan çıkan doğal 
bir kestirim, firmaların limitte işbirlikçi bir sonuca işbirliksiz olarak gidecek­
leri yönündedir.
ANAHTAR KELİMELER: Delegasyon - Regülasyon - İşbirliksiz oyun - 
Bertrand rekabeti - Cournot rekabeti - Düopol - Ürün farklılaştırılması - 
Işçi-işveren oyunu - Verimlilik
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1 IN TR O D U C TIO N
”If control of my decisions is in the hands of an agent whose preferences are 
different from my own, I may nevertlieless prefer the results to those that 
would come about if I took my own decisions.” noted .John Vickers in his 
1985 paper.
Actually, economists have directed their attentions to the objective func­
tions of large corporations. Some have suggested that large firms are more 
concerned with maximizing revenues or market shares rather than profits. 
Although there may be many reasons behind this intuitions and suggestions, 
the complexity of managerial decision processes and management has been 
shown as one of the main reasons.
A number of modern authors, Koray and Sertel(1989), Fershtman and 
Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987), Vickers(1985), analyzed the problem for the sym­
metric duopoly with constant marginal cost and with one owner-one man­
ager in each firm such that owners simultaneously choose their managers’ 
incentives and then each manager chooses the firm’s price or quantity and 
owners receive the resulting profits, and each manager is rewarded according 
to the incentives chosen by his owner. The results are very interesting in 
the sense that firms are not maximizing profits directly, and when managers 
compete in quantities, the result more closely resembles perfect competition 
tha.n does Cournot behavior; conversely, when they compete in prices, the 
result more closely resembles collusion than does Bertrand behavior. Vick- 
ers(1985) showed also that if there are n firms competing in quantity where 
all but one maximize profit, then the firm which is not maximizing directly 
its profit earns more no matter what the number of firms in the market is
1
II, is natural to expect that in an oligopol} ,^ where each firm has one owner- 
one manager and is competing in qua.ntity, as the number of firms goes to 
infinity, the market will converge to the purely competitive one. On the 
other hand, Koray and Sertel sliowed that the convergence in any in— firm 
symmetric oligopoly with delegation is much more rapid than under naked 
Cournot competition, and actually it is as if — m ghost copies of a typical 
firm in the symmetric oligopoly have been activated in competition. This 
really needs further attention for in this way the industry produces m? — m 
fictitious firms without any further fixed costs.
At this point, a.n interesting question is whether in a Cournotic symmetric 
duopoly with constant marginal cost, there is any incentive for delegation 
to more than one manager? This cpiestion was first posed by Koray and 
Sertel(1989) where they found the following results:
In absence of extraneous delegation costs,
1) each owner has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of his 
delegation chain.
2) as the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound,
i) total output at the (Cournot) equilibrium on the industry floor con­
verges in monotonically increasing fashion to the socially efficient one, and
ii) the maximand delegated by each primal delegator converges in mono­
tonically decreasing fashion to the (true) profit function.
As a consequence, it is suggested that, in a linear duopoly context, socially 
efficient and truthful outcomes can be arbitrarily closely approximated by the 
use of a Pretend-but-Perform Mechanism of sufficiently large order.
The above result is very important in the sense that to get the socially
efficient result, it is not needed to have many firms in the industry; it can 
also be attained by lengthening the delegation chains, with only two firms.
There is a problematic point in Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987)(FJS) 
propose this meta-cournotic equilibrium (Cournotic on the industry floor and, 
with this institutionalized, also a la Cournot-Nash, in the owners’ club) as a 
positive economic theory. Koray and Sertel(1989) first to criticize this defi­
ciency in the literature and discussed three main reasons for not accepting 
FJS’ approach as a positive economic theory. They pointed out the following 
reasons;
1) There is no natural reason why F.JS managers would come to a Cournot 
equilibrium under assigned maximands. Not only are the managers not the 
recepients of these maximands, but the owners have no reason for instructing 
them to behave according to the Cournot-Nash solution concept.
2) There is no reason why the owners should limit the maximands they 
specify for their managers to the class given in FJS; to the contrary, they 
have incentives not to do so.
3) If redelegation is permitted, then there is incentive to redelegate. This 
is discussed in Koray and Sertel(1989b) in detail for the Cournotic duopoly.
Thus, Koray and Sertel concluded if the FJS approach to the problem 
is from the view point of regulation, then it can be accepted, i.e. for them 
all artificial restrictions are admissible. Otherwise, the solutions cannot be 
imposed as a contribution to positive economic theory.
Now almost all ingredients for our motivation towards the present work 
are ready. In a duopoly with Bertrand competition, the results more closely 
resemble collusion than ordinary Bertrand Competition. Although this con-
elusion is reached in many papers likeSklivas(1987), Fershtman and Judd(1987), 
why delegation is stopped at one chain is not discussed. VVe owe this redele­
gation idea to Koray and Sertcl(1989). Thus our aim is to show the following:
In the context of a symmetric linear Bertrand duopoly where redelegai.ion is 
permitted and in the absence of extraneous delegation costs:
1) each princii^al has an incentive to redelegate, increasing the length of 
his delegation chain.
2) as the length of the delegation chain grows beyond bound,
i) total output at the (Bertrand) equilibrium on the industry floor con­
verges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the collusive one, and
ii) the maximand delegated by each primal delegator converges in mono­
tonically increasing fashion to the (true) profit function.
As a consequence, it is suggested that in a linear duopoly context collu­
sive and truthful outcomes can be arbitrarily closely approximated by the 
use of redelegation of sufficiently large order. But we wish to emphasize 
that the results presented here are proved for particular cases where the 
delegation chain lenght is 0 ,1,..,5, whereas the general formulas regarding 
the economic variables for arbitrary chain lenght are still in the status of 
conjectures, though there are auspicious clues leading to these.
2 IN TU ITIV E ILLUSTRATION
Before introducing our model formally, we wish to consider some simple 
examples to illustrate that under some institutions ’’non-profit maximizers” 
actually can surpass profit maximizers.
1) John Vickers gave the following example in his paper (1985)
Suppose firm A is deciding whether or not to enter a market currently 
monopolized by firm B.
Entry of A is profitable if and only if B does not fight. Faced with 
potential entry , it is more profitable for B to accommodate than to fight, 
but B’s profits are greater still if there is no entry.
Consider how the game would unfold in each of the following circum­
stances (which are assumed to be common knowledge) :
1) B’s managers are alwa.ys concerned to maximize profits
II)B’s managers are principally concerned to maintain their dominance 
over the market : considerations of profit are secondary.
' In case I, it is clear that entry will take place and will be accommodated. 
If B’s managers were to fight entry, they would be failing to maximize profits. 
Relying on this fact, A will enter the market.
In case II, however, entry will be deterred, because A knows that B’s 
managers would fight entry. The detail of this illustra.tion is discussed in the 
paper.
2) Here, I give a simple example.
Assume inverse demand is given by P = a — b{xj\ -b .tb) with a > 3c, 
where x a i '^B «^ re the outputs of firm A and firm B, respectively. Assume 
also that the duopolistic industry is Cournotic and each firm has a constant
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marginal cost c.
Case i) Firm A and B both maximize their profits, and this is common 
knowledge. Then we will get the following results: 
xa = xb = (a -  c)/36 
P = (a + 2c)/3
= Bs = (a -  c)V96
Case ii) Firm A maximizes its profit again but firm B maximizes its sales. 
Then we will obtain:
Xa =  (o — 2c)/36, Xb = (a + c)/36 
P  =  (a +  c)/3
n^i = (a — c)^/96 , Bb = (a — 2c)(a c)/9b
If we compare the two cases, it can be concluded that B ^ < B^ and 
> B^. Bence, firm B earns more profit while maximizing sales. Roughly 
speaking, for a firm it is not needed to directly maximize profit to get maxi­
mum profit. John Vickers noted this idea by saying :” it is not nonsense to 
say that u-maximizers do not necessarily maximize u.”.
To come closer to the problem mentioned in the introduction, let us first 
look at Vickers’ example about one owner-one manager case for a symmetric 
oligopoly.
We assume that there are n firms in the industry and the objective of 
managers of firm i is to maximize
Mi — B,· -f Oiqi (1)
where
n,· =  p{Q)qi -  cqi (2)
and Q = Y,qi. Combining (1) and (2), we have 
Mi = p{Q)qi -  (c -  Oi)qi
It can be seen immediately that Mi is the same as the objective function 
of a profit-maximizing firm with unit cost of c — Oi. We assume that the game 
is solved in the Nash-Cournot fashion. Suppose that p{Q) = A — Q. Then 
in equilibrium , we have 
q : ^ { p * - c  + 0i)
p* ^ { A  + n c - Z 0 j ) / { n  + l)
Ml  =  q f
(It is assumed that, p* > c — Oi for all i)
Since n,· = Mi — Oiqi^  it follows that
n.· = { A - c ~  E0j)[A - c + { n  + l)0i - E 0 j ] / { n  + l ) \
The level of Oi which maximizes II,· given Oj for j  1 is 
0i = { n - l ) { A - c -  0j)/2n
The Nash equilibrium of 0-setting game is symmetric with 
0 =  (n — l)(y4 — c)l{n? -f 1) > 0 
Correspondingly, we have 
0 = n{A — c)l{n^ -f-1)
P = {A + iPc)/{iP -t- 1) 
fl = n{A -  cf!{iP P I f
Compared with the case in which all firms are managed by profit-maximizers, 
output per firm is higher, price is lower and profits are lower.
Note that for n > 1, 0 is decreasing in n and goes to zero in the limit.
So, in this example, the extent of deviation from profit-maximization at the 
symmetric equilibrium vanishes as competition grows.
Now, briefly consider the case in which Oj =  0 for j  = 2..n. That is, 
all firms but one are profit-maximizers. It can be seen that then =  (n — 
l)(y4 — c)/2n in which case
Hi = (v4 — cY¡An = nTI,·, j  = 2..72
This shows rather vividly the extent to which non-profit maximizers can 
surpass profit-maximizers in terms of profits. Indeed, here the non-profit- 
maximizer earns greater profits than those of his rivals added together, no 
matter how many rivals there are.
3 DELEGATING W ITH  ONE M A N A G E R
Now, we will discuss the Sldivas (1987) model in more detail since our work 
will also follow the similar model. Also Kora.y and Sertcl(1989) observed the 
same conclusions for asymmetric costs and only for the Cournot case.
In Sklivas’ model, there is a duopoly in which firms, each having one 
owner and one manager , play a. two-stage game. In the first stage the owners 
simultaneously write and publicl}' announce contracts with their managers 
that specify how they will be rewarded. In the second stage, the managers si­
multaneously choose their firms’ output. Owners receive the resulting profits 
and managers are rewarded according to their contracts. Actually Fershtman 
and Judd (1985) independently and simultaneoiKsly obtain results similar to 
those in Sklivas’. By applying Nash equilibrium to both stages of the game, 
we obtain a subgame-perfect equilibrium as our solution.
Owner i measures his manager’s performance according to some function 
of his firm’s profits(n,·) and revenues (7?.j·). We call this measure ,^·, i = 1,2. 
The higher gi , the higher is manager i's bonus or the lower is the likelihood 
that he will be fired. Because firm i's output (,t;) does not enter manager i's 
utility directly, he chooses .t,: to maximize gi. g, is measured to be a linear 
combination of profits and revenues :
gi =  A,n,(.-ri,.T2) +  (1 -  Ai)i?i(.Ti,.T2) =/?.,(.t,,.T2) -  XiCi{xi) , i =  1,2 
Owner i simply chooses the parameter \i  to determine his manager’s 
incentives.
DEFINITION 1:
(.Tj,.^ )^ is a Nash equilibrium in the managers’ subgame if and only if
x*i =  argmax gi{xi,x*j), {i,j} =  { 1, 2}
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It, is asstimecl that tlie owner knows demand and costs.
DEFINITION 2:
(Aj, A2) is a. Nash equilibriiirn in the owner’s subgame if and only if A* = 
nrgmax II,(.Ti(A,·, A^ )^, .r;(A,·, Ap {?:,;} = {1,2} ,
3.1 Q U A N T IT Y  C O M PETITIO N
Let there be a homogeneous product and let the marginal cost be constant. 
Without loss of generality let c = 1. We ha.ve P  =  a — hx  ^ where P is the 
price, a > 1 and x = xi +  X2. We find manager i’s best response function, 
<j)i{xj,Xi), by maximizing ^¿(.) over ,t,·. As A,· is decreased, costs are weighted 
less, and <j)i{.) shifts out. Hence, decreasing A,· commits manager i to behave 
more aggressively.
x% “  Aj ■”  hxj^l^h — (j)i{^ Xj^
The Nash equilibrium quantities as a function of (Aj, A2) are 
X* = (a -  2A,· +  Aj)/36 , j  = 1,2, j
Notice that as the owner i makes his manager more aggressive, by de­
creasing A,·, his own firm’s output increases, while his rival’s decreases in 
equilibrium. We have the following profit function for the owners: 
n(A,·, Xj) = [M -b A,(6 -  a -  Xj) -  2X]]/9h 
where, M = — 3a — 3A,· -b 2aXj -b A|
The owner’s best-response function and Nash equilibrium are given as:
Aj =  (6 — a — Aj)/4 
A* = ( 6 - a ) /5 ,  f =  l,2  
PROPOSITION 1:
In the owner-manager game managers behave more aggressively than
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profit ma.ximizers, i.e. A* < I i = 1,2. This results in outputs that 
are higher than in Cournot model, yet still below the social optimum, i.e. 
a/26>a:K A i,A ^)>.Ti(l,l) ,7:=1,2
3.2 PR IC E  CO M PETITIO N
In this section, we will look at Sklivas’ price competition case in more detail.
We analyze this for l.he case of symmetric product differentiation, linear 
demand, and constant ma.rginal cost c. We write linear demand as:
Xi = a -  Pi + l3Pj, 0 < 13 < l  , i , j  = l , 2 i  ^  j  0 < c <  
where P,· is firm i’s price. The solution concept is the same as above one. 
Manager i's best-response function is:
Pi = (a -f A,c -f- l3Pj)/2 = (j>i{Pj, A,·)
The Nash equilibrium prices as a function of (Ai, A2) are 
P* =  (2or + 2AjC -f o;/? -f (3\jc)j(4 — ¡3^ )
Notice that as A,· varies, botli prices move in the same direction. This 
yields the following profit function for the owners, where K  = (2a -f a/3 + 
Xj/3c){2(x -f a/? +  l3\jC — 4c -|- ¡3'^ c) is a constant.
n i ( A , · ,  A ,· )  =  [K+Xi{2a/3^c+al3^c+/3^c^Xj-Gi3^c'^+l3^c'^+8c'^)+X]{2/3^c‘^ - 
4c^)]/(4 — i , j  — 1,2 , i ^  j  The owner’s best-response functions and
Nash equilibrium incentives are given as follows:
A,· =  (2a^^ -f a/3  ^ -|- /3^ XjC — 6/3^ c -f (3‘'c + 8c)/c(8 — 4/3 )^
A* = {2a/3'  ^ -f a/3  ^— Qj3'^ c -|- /3‘'c -f 8c)/c(8 — 4/3^  — /3^ ) ,i = 1,2 
PROPOSITION 2:
In the owner-manager game firms that compete in prices behave less 
aggressively tha.n profit maximizers, i.e. A* > 1. This results in higher prices
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than in Bertrand model i.e. Pi{Xl,Xl) > /^¿*(1,1).
The consequences of the separation of ownership and management are 
reversed under price competition; firms act as profit maximizers with greater 
than true cost, resulting in higher prices.
Here, the reader may wonder what the wages of managers are. One 
possible explanation is as follows: Wages paid to managers are fixed and 
there are many of equa.l quality managers so that owners can find others if 
the present ones do not behave in accordance with the delegated rnaximands. 
We adopt the same explanation in our discussions.
12
4 EXTEND IN G  THE DELEGATION CHAIN  
LENGTH
4.1 THE CO URN O T CASE W ITH  HOM OGENEOUS  
PR O D U C T
As mentioned in the introdiiction, one may ,moreover, wonder that what 
restrains owners redelegating further. Koray and Sertel (1989) discussed this 
problem in detail and first found that if there is no restriction on redelegating 
in a symmetric Cournotic duopoly, there is incentive to do so. Actually, if 
both owners have k chain below, then one lengthening one more will gain 
more profit than the other owner. It should be noted that the following 
results follow under the assumption that none of the owners can decrease the 
chain.
Let price he P = a — (.ti + .T2) where 1 and 2 are names of firms producing 
the same good. The equilibrium A’s of owners to be assigned to the below 
managers are:
A * —  A *  —  i M H i i M U z v  f), — n — c"'l.O — ^2,0 — fc(2A+3) <^·
where k is the number of managers in a. firm.
Note that
d\* < 0 and limjt_,co Aj „ = a which means that as chain grows, owner 
will exeggarate less his true efficiency and in the limit, he will tell the true 
one, a = a — c.
Total output in the industry in equilibrium is:
X* =  .-Cj + x^ = and ^  > 0 and limfc_oo = «
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Thus, output will increase and reach the socially efficient one. They 
noted that for any fixed k £ N, each owner exaggerates the efficiency of 
his firm when he sends down a maximand to his immediate subordinate is 
greater than his firm’s true efficiency a  (except for trivial case where a  = 
0). Moreover, the efficiency is further exaggerated which /i‘^ ' level delegate 
receives from (h + level delegate the parameter which
is greater than whenever h 6 K  — {0}. So, total industrial output
corresponds to that at the ordinary Cournot equilibrium of a symmetric linear 
duopoly with an exaggerated efficiency and is thus greater than total output 
at the ordinary Cournot equilibrium of the actually existing symmetric linear 
duopoly whose true efficiency is a.
Furthermore, they also noticed that the paradoxical thing as the length 
of the delegation chain gets larger, the owners exaggerate their efficiency 
less, yet total industrial output becomes greater. But it can be explained 
that at the industrial floor efficiency = which is monotonically
increasing function of k. and as k —> oo, efficiency of floor goes to | a  which 
is consistent with the fact that output at the ordinary Cournot equilibrium 
of a symmetric linear duopoly with efficiency | a  is equal to efficient output 
where efficiency = a.
4.2 THE BER TR A N D  CASE W ITH  TW O D IF­
FERENTIATED PRO DUC TS
Now we are ready to explain our contributions. Actually, we will follow the 
same model as Sklivas’ one such that there is a symmetric duopoly with 
constant marginal cost ,c and firms perform the Bertrand competition at the
14
floor level.
There are two cliiFerentiated products 1,2 and demands are:
Xi = a -  Pi + l3Pj, i j  = 1,2, 0 < /3 < 1.
where P(s are prices of commodities. Actually, we will assume 0 < c < 
so that we eliminate the case of inaction in the equilibrium. The reason­
ing of 0 < /? < 1 is obvious. Moreover, we assume that there is no extraneous 
cost to redelegate and it is permissible. Our conjectures are almost evident 
that as opposed to Cournot case (Koray and Sertel(1989)) one can expect 
that as delegation chain grows, the equilibrium profits, prices and outputs 
will converge to that of collusion case, i.e. joint-profit maximization one. 
First let us give the results of collusion case: 
il-ia.Tp, -I- ri2
where II,· is the firm’s profit, i = 1,2.
Maxp„p,{Pi -  c)(cv -  Pi + I3P2) +  (P2 -  c)(a - P 2 + 0Px) =  / ( A ,  P2 )
F.O.C.
dPi ^
-2A = 09P2
From here, one can easily find that at the optimal point :
P * —  P * —  Q  I £
•‘ 1 — ^2  2( l-/ 3) ' 2
a - c ( l - p )— .1-2 — 2
rr*  _  TT* _  [g -c(l-ff)]^
1^1 -  ¡ -h  -  4(l-/3)
Let us explain how to find subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in our model. 
Although following backward or forward induction is not important, we will 
follow backward one. Now given a. fixed number, n, of delegation, at the 
floor, level n, they will decide prices via making Bertrand competition.
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Iin,j = ?7 + 1, i  > 2?Z -  1
and 77 is the number of managers in each firm.
Then lim„_oo AJ o = 1 i<»d AJ 0(77 + 1) < AJ q(«)
Although we have found A*_q by looking at the results found by the pro­
gram , one has to prove it. Also note that, for now, we disregard any in­
determinacy in the limit via relying on our g's regularity. These results, 
if true, enable us to make the interpretation that as the delegation chain 
gets larger, owner’s delegation will approach to the true one, i.e. Ajq = 1 
and this convergence will be monotonic. Notice that according to these re­
sults, Cournot case (Koray and Sertel(1989)) and Bertrand case give the 
same qualitative convergences. Moreover, Unver (1995) who tried the same 
problem by using Cournot competition ,i.e. symmetric linear Cournotic 
duopoly with different]a.ted products, has found graphically and intuitively 
that lim„_,oo Aj Q = q = 1 and Aj_o(t7. + 1) > Aj_o(77). Interestingly, for 
a fixed n £ N,  our A* q(t7.) and Unver’s one are symmetric with respect to
A i ,o  =  1 ·
STATEMENT 2:
In the above game, the equilibrium output of firms are:
X* — X* ; (^^ 2 ' '^1 V / /(^)
where
g{n) =  13^
hnj —
hn-i,j + K - 2,j- 2  if i  even and I < j  < n  
0 if j  odd and I < j  < n
17
— 1
hn,n+ l
1 if n odd 
0 if n even
^n,n - ^
0 if n odd 
if n even
and
hnj — ^
hn-i,j + if j  even 2 < j  < n  + l
hn,j-i if j  odd 2 < j  < n +  1
h-nO — — ^^ n,n+l — 1
Here, we can have one more conjecture that:
lim -  1mu„_oo — 2
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5 W ELFARE COM PARISONS A N D  CON­
CLUDING REM ARKS
DEFINITION:
Welfare is defined as the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus, i.e.
W = P S  + CS
vr = (n . + n ,)  + (E L, /o*'|C(ii.x·) -
Since, in our model, demands are affine, it is easy to find a compact form 
for the welfare function. The commodity’s producers’ and consumers’ 
surplus are found as follows:
PS. = xHP: -  c)
CSi = (Pr - P ’Y i .  i = l , 2
where a:*, P* are the equilibrium values and P~ is the the price at which 
the demand curve intersects the price-axis.
Since we know that at equilibrium both firms have the same price and 
quantities, we can write the welfare formula as follows:
W = VE, -f IT2 = 2(P.?i -b CS2)
One should notice that we are dealing with calculating only equilibrium 
welfares. Actually, there may be many different kinds of welfare functions, 
but here we accepted the usual one which gives the same weight to both 
producer and consumer sides.
Using this formula, we got the graphs for pure Bertrand case, one owner- 
one manager,..., one owner-5 manager and collusion case and took a  = 2, c = 
l.(see A6)
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It is seen from the graphs that for sufficient]}' small /?'s there is no signifi­
cant difference among l.he welfares; however, one can easily conclude that all 
welfare graphs coincide at some f t— twine and this has a very strong implica­
tion that there exists some market in which application of any two of different 
regulations mentioned afiove give the same welfare for the society under our 
welfare function. That is, none of the above cases has a uniform superiority 
according to welfare. Moreover, if we examine the marginal welfare graphs, 
i.e. the graphs showing the difference between one case and the other that 
has one more manager, we see that there are some ft's at which they are 
equal and for sufficiently large ft, the marginal welfare is decreasing (see A7). 
On the other hand, collusion case compared with one owner-5 manager case 
is worse for most of the ft — values. This is not surprising because as firms 
try to collude, consumers will lose more.
In the study, we basically combined the ideas in papers Koray and Ser- 
tel(1989) and Sklivas(1987) for a. symmetric duopoly that compete in prices, 
where redelegation is permitted. In fact, Sklivas(1987) proved that under 
rather mild conditions, in a. symmetric duopoly in which each firm has one 
owner-one manager and that compete in prices, firms will beha.ve less aggres­
sively i.e. equilibrium prices will be higher than that of the naked Bertrand 
Model. In addition, profits of firms will increase. Using the same model 
as Sklivas and ha.ving the motivation of redelegating from Koray and Sertel 
(1989), we have a. very important clue that according to the profit graphs, 
firms will have positive incentive to redelegate and it seems that profit ap­
proaches the collusive one. Although we have a strong intuition for our 
conjecture that as the number of managers goes to infinity, firms will ap­
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proach to collusion, the statements have not been proved yet. We believe, if 
true, this collusion result is very crjicial in the sense two firms can collude 
non-cooperatively and this can be proposed as a regulation mechanism.
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Appendix A
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XMAPLE PROGRAM
n:=l;
xl;=a-pl+b*p2; 
x2:=a-p2+b'"pl; 
pii [n]:=(pl-l 1 [n-l]*c)=''x I; 
pr2[n];=(p2-12[n-l]*c)*x2;
{number of managers}
{demand equation for good 1} 
{demand equation for good 2} 
(firm 1 profit)
I firm 2 profit)
assign(sol ve( {di ff(pr I [n],p 1 )=0,diff(pr2[n],p2)=0}, {p 1 ,p2))); {bertrand 
competition at floor level)
for i from n-1 by -1 to 1 do
prl[i]:=(pl-ll[i-l]*c)*xl;
pr2[i]:=(p2-12[i-l]*c)*x2;
assign(solve((diff(prl[i],ll[i])=0,diffCpr2[il,12fi])=0),(ll[i],12[i]})) 
od;{solves all lamdas till the owner’s
one)
factor(ll[l]); {factorizes lambda)
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